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This paper presents a political economy model of public standards in an open economy 
model. We use the model to derive the political optimum and to analyze different factors 
that have an influence on this political equilibrium. The paper discusses how the level of 
development influences the political equilibrium. We also analyze the relation between 
trade and the political equilibrium and compare this political outcome with the social 
optimum to identify under which cases ‘under-standardization’ or ‘over-standardization’ 
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Trade, Development, and the Political Economy of Public Standards 
Johan F.M. Swinnen and Thijs Vandemoortele 
 
 “Under the German [trade] law of 1880 imports of livestock were controlled for 
‘sanitary reasons’. By 1889 the government had all but closed the borders to imports of 
live animals. … A law of 1900 prohibited imports of sausages, canned meat and meat 
with preservatives; imports of pickled and salted meat had to be in pieces of at least 4 kg; 
imports of meat (other than pickled or salted) had to consist of whole beef carcasses or 
half pig carcasses, could enter only at certain ports and on certain days, and were 
subject to high inspection fees. If the quality of imported meat was judged doubtful, it was 




“Les frontières ne sont, pour ainsi dire, 
 jamais plus ouvertes que quand vous les déclarez fermées”
2 




In  the  last  decades,  the world  market is experiencing a  proliferation  of  standards.  A 
growing number of public standards are being introduced globally, in a broad range and 
rich variety of areas, including nutrition (e.g. low fat), health (e.g. low lead or pesticide 
residue), safety (e.g. no small toy parts, equipment safety measures), environment (e.g. 
organic, no genetically  modified organisms, low carbon dioxide emission) and social 
concerns (e.g. no child labor).  
Trade economists have mostly interpreted this growth in the number and form of 
public standards as a political economy response to the constraints being imposed by 
                                                 
1 Tracy (1989, p91-92) 
2 “The borders are, in a way of speaking, never more open than when you declare them closed.” (Chambre 
des  Représentants  (Nov.18,  1897),  cited  in  Van  Molle,  1989,  p.  230).  This  was  Parliamentary 
Representative Van Naemen’s reaction in Belgian parliament to the government’s 1897 decision to restrict 
imports of livestock because of ‘the danger of imports of diseases’. From a health point of view, the official 
closing of the borders had a perverse effect as it induced massive smuggling without any health inspection.   4
international trade agreements on traditional trade restrictions.
3 As the use of tariffs is 
progressively more limited, new forms of non tariff barriers (NTBs) are increasingly used 
(e.g. Baldwin 2001; OECD 2001; Sturm 2006). In this interpretation public standards are 
just a new form of NTBs and protection-in-disguise.
4 For example  Fischer and Serra 
(2000)  find  that  standards  are  biased  against  imports  and  favor  domestic  producers. 
Bredahl et al. (1987) illustrate this with the USA’s implementation of a larger minimum 
size requirement on vine-ripened tomatoes – mainly imported from Mexico – than on 
green tomatoes produced in  Florida. Anderson  et al. (2004) argues that  governments 
raise genetically modified (GM) food standards as protection against imports.
5 Fulton 
and Giannakas (2004) point out that producers will prefer GM labeling when they have 
low returns on GM food. In their infamous example, Otsuki et al. (2001) claim that a new 
EU standard on aflatoxins reduced health risk by approximately 1.4 deaths per billion a 
year, while decreasing African exports of cereals, dried fruits and nuts to Europe by 64 
percent. Krueger (1996) concludes that, although it is not possible to generalize about 
labor standards’ effects, many economists still argue that international labor standards are 
protectionist instruments.
6  
                                                 
3 In this paper we focus on public standards. For a discussion of the relation between public and private 
standards, see e.g. Henson (2006), McCluskey (2007). 
4 For literature related to the effects of standards as barriers to trade, see for example Barrett (1994), Sykes 
(1995), Thilmany and Barrett (1997), Schleich (1999), Suwa-Eisenmann and Verdier (2000), Barrett and 
Yang (2001). 
5 See also Baltzer (2006) who argues that domestic producers always favor more restrictive GMO standards 
because of positive border costs. 
6 In an earlier contribution, Bockstael (1984) argues that the same holds for domestic quality standards. She 
argues that these are mainly redistributive instruments and do not enhance welfare – they protect certain 
producer interests.   5
However,  this  trade-protection  interpretation  of  public  standards  appears  to 
conflict with some basic empirical observations. Many public standards, such as EU GM 
regulations, are introduced following demands by consumers, not producers. In fact, in 
many  cases  producers  have  opposed  their  introduction.  If  public  standards  would  be 
merely  protectionist  instruments  producers  would  support  their  introduction  and 
consumers  would  oppose  them.  Tian  (2003)  demonstrates  that  an  increase  in  the 
minimum  required  ‘environmental  friendliness’  of  imported  goods  is  not  necessarily 
protectionist  in  effect  as  it  may  hurt  domestic  firms  and  increase  imports.  In  the 
framework of Marette and Beghin (2007) a standard is anti-protectionist when foreign 
producers  are  more  efficient  than  domestic  producers  at  addressing  consumption 
externalities by the standard. 
These observations are in line with insights from the literature on the economics 
of quality standards. For example, Ronnen (1991), Boom (1995) and Valletti (1995) all 
find  positive  effects  of  minimum  quality  standards  on  consumers’  welfare,  but  find 
mixed effects on overall welfare. Leland (1979) shows that, in general, the effect of a 
minimum quality standard on welfare is ambiguous. In a vertical product differentiation 
framework Ronnen (1991) shows that minimum quality standards increase welfare under 
Bertrand competition between firms, while Valletti (2000) finds that welfare decreases 
but under Cournot competition. 
  This paper integrates these different perspectives in an open economy framework 
and develops a formal political economy model of public standards. Our analysis has 
three  specific  objectives,  which  are  addressed  in  three  parts  of  the  paper.  The  first 
objective is to develop a political economy  model of public standards in which both   6
producers  and  consumers  are  actively  and  simultaneously  lobbying.  In  our  model 
standards benefit consumers because of the standards’ guarantee that the product satisfies 
certain characteristics preferred by the consumer. Producers’ production costs increase 
with implementation of the public standard. However, we show that either producers or 
consumers  may  gain  or  lose,  depending  on  the  resulting  market  prices  in  an  open 
economy where importers also have to satisfy the standards. With these potential welfare 
effects,  we  derive  the  political  equilibrium  and  we  analyze  how  the  equilibrium  is 
affected by several political and economic characteristics. 
  Our second objective is to derive if and why the political equilibrium standard 
changes with development. Empirically one observes important differences in the use of 
public standards across countries and there appears a positive correlation between public 
standards and income. An important question is what causes this correlation. Some have 
simply  argued  that  rich  consumers  (countries)  desire  higher  standards  (Maertens  and 
Swinnen 2007; Wilson and Abiola 2003). We find that the impact of development on the 
government’s choice of standards is more complex and depends on several factors – 
including, besides consumer preferences, compliance costs and enforcement problems. 
Our third objective is to analyze if or when public standards are protectionist 
instruments. In this third part of the paper we compare the political equilibrium with the 
social optimum and we derive under which conditions public standards can be considered 
‘protectionism’. We show that politically optimal public standards may be either too high 
(‘over-standardization’)  or  too  low  (‘under-standardization’)  –  a  situation  which  is 
similar  to  other  forms  of  price  and  trade  policy  which  governments  use  to  tax  or 
subsidize certain sectors (Krugman 1987; Grossman and Helpman 1994).   7
The Model 
A key issue is obviously how to model standards. The approaches in the literature differ 
importantly. Some (such as Bockstael 1984; Ronnen 1991; Valletti 2000) assume that 
consumers can costlessly observe product characteristics ex ante, while others (such as 
Leland 1979) assume that consumers are ex ante uncertain about the characteristics of the 
product.  In  the  latter  case  standards  can  improve  upon  the  unregulated  market 
equilibrium by reducing the asymmetric information between consumers and producers. 
Yet other studies (such as Copeland and Taylor 1995; Fischer and Serra 2000; Anderson 
et al. 2004; Tian 2003; Besley and Ghatak 2007) model the effect of standards as their 
impact  on  consumption  externalities.  This  could  relate  to,  for  example,  minimum 
standards on catalytic converters in cars or GM foods. Most studies consider that the 
introduction of standards implies compliance costs for producers (amongst many others 
Leland 1979; Ronnen 1991; Valletti 2000), and this holds both for domestic producers 
and those in countries (interested in) exporting to the country that imposes the standard 
(Henson and Jaffee 2007; Suwa-Eisenmann and Verdier 2002). 
Consider therefore an economy where consumers have heterogeneous preferences 
for  a  public  standard
7  imposed  in  this  sector.  A  standard  which  guarantees  certain 
quality/safety features of the product affects utility as it reduces or solves informational 
asymmetries. Therefore a standard will induce to consume more of the product through 
an increased willingness to pay, ceteris paribus. For example consumers who perceive 
health problems with certain (potential) ingredients or production processes may increase 
consumption  if  they  are  guaranteed  the  absence  of  these  elements.  We  call  this  the 
                                                 
7 The standards under analysis have a direct effect on the utility of consumers. Hence these standards are 
‘quality standards’ (see Fischer and Serra 2000) but for simplicity we refer to them as ‘standards’.   8
‘consumption effect’. To model this
8, assume that individuals consume at most one unit 
of the good and their preferences are described by the following utility function (see 
Tirole 1988): 
( )    if he buys the good with standard   at price 
=
0                     if he does not buy 
i
i
s p s p
u
f e  + - 

 
      (1) 
where  i f  is the preference parameter. Consumers with higher  i f  are more willing to pay 
for  a  product  with  a  public  standard  s  and  the  non-standard-related  value  e   of  the 
product
9. A higher s refers to a more stringent standard.  i f  is uniformly distributed over 
the interval  [ ] 1, f f -  with  1 f ³  and  { } 1, , i N Î K . Consumers with  ( ) i p s f e < +  will 
not  consume  this  product  which  implies  that  the  market  will  be  ‘uncovered’.  The 
aggregate demand function
10 is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) c , p s N p s f e = - +                 (2) 
On  the  production side,  we  assume  that  production  is  a function of  a  sector-
specific input factor that is available in inelastic supply. All profits made in the sector 
accrue to this specific factor. The unit cost function  ( ) ( ) ( ) g , k , t g q s q s s = = +  depends 
                                                 
8  Our  approach  of  modelling  standards  is  consistent  with  the  standard  approach  in  the  literature  on 
minimum quality standards (see e.g. Ronnen 1991, Jeanneret and Verdier 1996, Valletti 2000). 
9 We assume that the non-standard-related value e  and the public quality standard  s  can be separated from 
one another, i.e. that they are additively separable in the consumer utility function, but that consumer 
preferences for e  and  s  run parallel with each other. 
10 For the reminder of this analysis we assume that  ( ) p s e f + £  holds such that aggregate consumption is 
always positive. The (exogenous) constant  e  ensures that consumption is positive when the standard is 
zero.   9
on output produced ( ) q  and the level of standards in that sector ( ) s , and is composed of 
production costs  ( ) k , q s  and transaction costs  ( ) t s .
11 
We assume that a standard imposes some production constraints or obligations 
which increase production and transaction costs. The idea behind this assumption is that 
all standards can be defined as the prohibition to use a cheaper technology. Examples are 
the prohibition of an existing technology (e.g. child labor) or of a technology that has not 
yet  been  used  but  that  could  potentially  lower  costs  (e.g.  GM  technology).  Also 
traceability standards can be interpreted as a prohibition of cheaper production systems 
which  do  not  allow  tracing  the  production.  Therefore,  standards  may  increase  the 




¶   >   ¶  
. Standards may also increase the transaction costs  ( ) t s  because of 




¶   >   ¶  
. This implies that the 
unit costs increase with higher standards  0
g
s
¶   >   ¶  
 for  0 s >
13.  
The model assumes a small open economy where domestic firms are price takers and 
domestic prices of imported goods equal world prices. We assume that when the country 
                                                 
11 This approach has two advantages. First it allows to differentiate between different types of costs in our 
analysis of the relation between development and the political economy of public standards. Second, it 
allows to distinguish between standards with scale neutral cost effects  ( ) ( ) t s  and standards that reinforce 
(dis)economies of scale ( ) ( ) k , q s . 
12 We implicitly assume that control and enforcement costs are born by producers. 
13 Modelling the cost of standards with a unit cost function that is increasing in the standard is consistent 
with e.g. Fischer and Serra (2000) and Tian (2003).   10
imposes a standard, the production costs of the imported goods also rise as the standard is 
also imposed on imported goods – and is equally enforced. This leads to a price increase, 
henceforth called the ‘marginal price effect’ of a standard  0
p
s
¶   >   ¶  
. More specifically, 
the unit cost function of foreign ( ) f  producers is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) g , k , t
f f f f f q s q s s = +  
where  ( ) k ,
f f q s   are  production  costs,  ( ) t
f s   transaction  costs  and 
f q   is  foreign 
production. The world price  p  then equals the unit costs of the foreign producers and as 
a result, we have  ( ) ( ) p g ,







A key result is that both producers and consumers may either gain or lose from (a 
change in) the standard. Consider first the producer effects. Producer profits are equal to 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { } max p g , p q s q s q s P = × -  
and  by  the  envelope  theorem  the  marginal  effect  on  producer’s  profits  ( ) p s P   of  a 




¶P ¶ ¶   = × -   ¶ ¶ ¶  
. 











. When the marginal unit cost 
increase is smaller than the marginal price effect, the sector-specific capital owners gain 
from an increase of the standard.  
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 is larger than the marginal increase in cost of consumption 






. Vice versa, if the marginal increase in the cost of consumption outweighs the 
beneficial marginal consumption effect, aggregate consumer surplus decreases with the 
standard. 
Finally,  we define welfare  ( ) W s   as  the  sum of  the  producer  profits  and  the 
consumer surplus in this sector, i.e. as  ( ) ( ) ( ) W p c s s s º P +P .      (3) 
The Political Equilibrium 
Consider a government that maximizes its own objective function which, following the 
approach of Grossman and Helpman (1994), consists of a weighted sum of contributions 
from lobbies and social welfare. Similar to Grossman and Helpman (1994), we restrict 
the set of policies available to politicians and only allow them to implement a public 
standard.  We  assume  that  producers  and  consumers  of  this  sector  are  politically 
organized and that they lobby simultaneously. This assumption differs from Grossman 
and Helpman (1994), Anderson et al. (2004) and Cadot et al. (2004). We believe it is not   12
realistic to assume that consumers are not organized – or do not effectively lobby – on 
issues related to product standards. There is substantive evidence that consumers and 
producers lobby governments on issues of public standards
14. 
The ‘truthful
15’ contribution scheme of the specific-capital owners is equal to the 
function  ( ) ( ) { } p C max 0; p p s s b = P - , in which the constant bp represents the share of 
profits the producers do not want to invest in lobbying the government. One could also 
interpret this constant bp as a minimum threshold, a level of profits or surplus below 
which the producers believe the return from lobbying is less than its cost. Similarly, the 
‘truthful’  contribution  scheme  of  the  consumers  will  be  of  the  form 
( ) ( ) { } c C max 0; c c s s b = P - ,  with  ( ) c s P   the  aggregate  consumer  surplus  as  defined 
earlier. The constant bc can be interpreted in the same way as in the contribution schedule 
of the specific-capital owners. The government’s objective function is a weighted sum of 
the  contributions  of  producers  (weighted  by  αp),  the  contributions  of  consumers 
(weighted  by  αc)  and  the  overall  social  welfare,  where  j a   ( ) , j p c =   represents  the 
relative lobbying strength: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) p c V C C W p c s = s s s a a + +              (4) 
The  government  chooses  the  level  of  the  standard  to  maximize  its  objective 
function  (4).  Each  possible  level  of  this  standard  corresponds  to  a  certain  level  of 
                                                 
14 In reality, consumer lobbying does not only occur through consumer organizations but also through 
political  parties  representing consumer interests.  See  also  Gulati  and  Roy  (2007)  on lobbying  of  both 
producers and consumers with respect to environmental standards. 
15 The common-agency literature (e.g. Bernheim and Whinston 1986) states that a truthful contribution 
schedule reflects the true preferences of the interest group. This implies in our political economy model that 
lobby groups will set their lobbying contributions in accordance with their expected profits and how these 
are marginally affected by the standard. We refer to the Appendix for a proof of the truthfulness of the 
contribution schemes in our model.   13
producer profits and consumer surplus, and hence also to a certain level of producer and 
consumer contributions. This is driven by the functional form and the truthfulness of the 
contribution schemes that show that the government will receive higher contributions 
from producers (consumers) if the imposed standard creates higher profits (consumer 
surplus) for producers (consumers). Conversely, the government receives less producer 
or  consumer  contributions  if  the  standard  decreases  respectively  profits  or  consumer 
surplus.  Therefore  maximizing  these  contributions  from  producers  (consumers)  by 
choosing  the  level  of  standard  is  equivalent  to  maximizing  their  profits  (consumer 
surplus). The government will thus choose the level of standards such that it maximizes 
the  weighted  sum  of  producer  profits,  consumer  surplus,  and  social  welfare.  The 
politically  optimal  standard, 
* s ,  is  therefore  determined  by  the  following  first  order 
condition
16, subject to 
* 0 s ³ : 
( ) ( )
2 *
* 2 *
* 1 1 0
2
p c
p g N p p
q c
s s s s
a a f
e
       ¶ ¶  ¶       + - + + - - =         ¶ ¶ + ¶            
.     (5) 
* c  and 
* q  denote respectively aggregate consumption and domestic production in the 
political optimum and 
* p  the equilibrium world price. 
The first term in equation (5) captures the marginal impact on producers’ profits 
weighted  by  their  lobbying  strength  ( ) 1 p a + .  As  we  explained  earlier  this  marginal 
impact may be positive or negative. The second term represents the weighted marginal 
                                                 
16 We assume that the domestic unit cost function  ( ) g , q s  and the world price  ( ) p s  (i.e. the foreign unit 
cost function) are sufficiently convex in the standard (
2 2 2
2 2 2 0,  0





, see e.g. Ronnen 1991; 
Valletti 2000; Fischer and Serra 2000) such that  ( ) V s  is concave in  s  and that first order condition (5) 
determines a global maximum.   14
impact of a public standard on aggregate consumer surplus which may also be positive or 
negative.  
Optimality condition (5) implicitly defines 
* s  as a function of several variables, 
such as lobbying strength  ( ) j a , consumer preferences  ( ) f , and the marginal unit cost 





  ¶  
. The impact of the exogenous variables ( ) , j a f  on the optimal standard can 
be formally derived through comparative statics. We refer the reader to the Appendix for 
these formal derivations and restrict ourselves here to the presentation and discussion of 
the effects. 
  First, it is obvious from condition (5) that a change in the political weights  j a  
( ) , j p c = ,  capturing  exogenous differences in  the  political  weight  of  a lobby  group, 
affects 
* s . When the political weight of a lobby group increases exogenously, it implies 
that its contributions are more effective in influencing the decisions of the government. 
However  the  sign  of  the  effect  on 
* s   depends  on the  relative  benefits  of 
* s   for  the 
interest  groups.  More  specifically,  an  increase  in  j a   leads  to  a  higher  standard 







>     ¶  
, if and only if interest group  j  gains from increasing the standard beyond 
* s , 







* s . In this case the government will set the optimal standard at a higher 
level if  j a  increases, and vice versa.   15
  Second, an exogenous change in the quality preferences  f  of consumers
17 will 
affect the politically optimal standard 
* s . A shift in consumer preferences affects the 
aggregate demand and consumer surplus. Higher consumer preferences for quality lead 
to higher consumer surplus and higher contributions in favor of public standards, which 








, and vice versa.
18 
Third, the marginal cost increase of domestic and foreign producers will affect the 




  ¶  
 
reduce the benefits of standards for domestic producers, ceteris paribus. This leads to 
lower standards as producers will reduce their contributions for public standards. The 
marginal unit cost increase of foreign producers is reflected in the marginal price effect 
f g p
s s
  ¶ ¶
=   ¶ ¶  
 of a public standard as the international market price increase will equal the 
increase in unit costs of foreign producers to comply with the standard.  
Notice  that  a  higher  marginal  unit  cost  increase  for  foreign  producers  may 
increase or decrease the politically optimal standard, depending on other factors. On the 
one hand, the resulting higher marginal price effect reduces consumer benefits and their 
contributions.  On  the  other  hand,  it  increases  profits  and  contributions  of  domestic 
                                                 
17 Under our assumptions, a change in f  only affects the boundaries of the preference distribution, not the 
distribution itself. Therefore f  is a measure for the average consumer preferences. 








* s . Violation of this condition would however imply that the individual 
willingness to pay for a marginal increase of the standard is negative at 
* s , even for the individual with the 
highest preference for quality  ( ) i f f = . By this condition we abstract from this case where consumption 
falls to zero.   16
producers. The size of these effects and the net effect depends on the relation between 
domestic  production  and  consumption  and  on  the  functional  form  of  the  various 
functions.  As  a  result,  standards  may  move  in  either  direction  with  changes  in  the 
marginal cost increase of foreign producers, depending on the relative benefits and the 
political weights of the different lobby groups. 
Finally,  an  important  general  implication  from  this  discussion  is  that  either 
consumers or producers may lobby in favor or against standards, and that the political 
equilibrium may be affected by various factors. 
Development and the Political Economy of Public Standards 
We can now use these results to explain the empirically observed positive relationship 
between standards and economic development. It is often argued that this relationship 
simply  reflects  consumer  preferences.  While  our  model  confirms  that  income-related 
preference  ( ) f   variations  play  a role, it  also  suggests  a  more  complex  set of  causal 
factors which affect the relationship between development and the political economy of 
public standards. Our analysis suggests several reasons for the wide variety in standards 
across the world, and in particular between developing (‘poor’) and developed (‘rich’) 
countries.  
  Define  I   as  the  country’s  per  capita  income,  i.e.  its  level  of  economic 
development, and  z   as  an  indicator  of  the  quality  of  the  institutions  in the  country. 
Studies  find  that  the  quality  of  institutions  (including  institutions  for  enforcement  of 
contracts  and  public  regulations)  is  positively  correlated  with  development  0
z
I
¶   >   ¶  
   17
(North 1990). The impact of development on the politically optimal level of standards 
* s  
can then be derived as: 
* * * *
s s
s s
t k s s s s z
I I t z k z I
f
f
  ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
= + +   ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶  
















The  first  term  is  positive  because  lower  income  levels  ( ) I   are  typically 
associated with lower consumer preferences for quality and safety standards as reflected 
in  differences  for  f   in  equation (6), with  f   smaller  for  poorer  countries  0
I
f ¶   >   ¶  
. 
Because the effect on aggregate consumer surplus of a public standard is lower for lower 
f , consumer contributions are lower in developing nations than in rich countries and this 






>   ¶  
.  
This is consistent with international survey evidence on consumer preferences for 
GM standards. Rich country consumers are generally more opposed to GM than poor 
country consumers. Consumers in rich countries have less to gain from biotech-induced 
farm productivity improvements compared to developing country consumers who have 
much  to  gain  from  cheaper  food  (McCluskey  et  al.  2003).  This  argument  is  also 
consistent with empirical observations that consumers from developed  countries have 
generally higher preferences for other applications of biotechnology, such as medical 
applications (Costa-Font et al. 2008; Hossain et al. 2003; Savadori et al. 2004) which 
have more (potential) benefits for richer consumers.    18
The second and third term in equation (6) capture how the quality of institutions 
affects  the  relationship  between  development  and  the  political  economy  of  public 
standards. The impact of standards on both production and transaction costs depends on 
the quality of a country’s institutions z .  






).  Lower  quality  of  institutions 
implies that enforcement and control costs of standards (i.e. the increase in transaction 






 in our model. These higher 







<   ¶  
. 
The third term is also positive. While poor countries, with low wages and less 
urban  pressure  on  land  use,  may  have  a  cost  advantage  in  the  production  of  raw 
materials, better institutions of rich countries lower the marginal increase in production 
costs  caused  by  standards  0
s k
z
¶   <   ¶  
.  A  lower  marginal  increase  in production  costs 
could result from higher education and skills of producers, better public infrastructure, 










Development and Pro- & Anti-Standard Coalitions 
In combination the factors which we discussed above are likely to induce a shift of the 
political  equilibrium  from  low  standards  to  high  standards  with  development.  If  we 
define a ‘coalition’ as both groups having the same preferences, i.e. either  0 s =  (anti) or   19
0 s >  (pro), then in extreme cases, the variations in the mechanisms identified here may 
result in a pro-standard coalition of consumers and producers in rich countries. In rich 
countries,  in  addition  to  consumers,  also  producers  may  support  standards  as  they 
enhance their competitive position against imports as compliance may be less costly for 
domestic producers compared to importers. In contrast, an anti-standard coalition may be 
present  in  poor  countries  as,  in  addition  to  producers,  consumers  may  also  oppose 
standards since they may be more concerned with low prices than standards. Formally, a 


















0 s = , and vice versa for an anti-standard coalition. 
Trade and the Political Economy of Public Standards 
An important aspect of public standards which has attracted a lot of attention is their 
potential  use  as  instruments  of  ‘protection  in  disguise’  (Vogel  1995).  This  is  also 
reflected in the rapid increase of notifications of new sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
measures to the WTO (see Figure 1). Among other things, member countries have to 
notify new SPS measures to the WTO when these measures have a significant effect on 
trade. This rapid increase in SPS measures notifications raises concerns on the potential 
protectionist nature of public standards. In fact, most studies on the political economy of 
standards  in  open  economy  models  consider  standards  as  protectionist  instruments 
(Anderson et al. 2004; Fischer and Serra 2000; Sturm 2006). 
To analyze this issue with our model it is important to first clarify some key 
elements in the relationship between trade and standards. As we will show in this section, 
standards can be set to benefit (or ‘protect’) producer or consumer interests. Hence, first   20
it  is  important  to  define  ‘protectionism’  as  producer  protectionism  (as  it  is  usually 
understood)  or  consumer  protection.  Second,  as  with  tariffs  and  trade  restrictions, 
standards  may  either  harm  or  benefit  producers.  Hence,  unlike  other  studies  suggest, 
there is no ex ante reason to see standards as producer protectionism. Third, while almost 
all  standards  affect  trade,  there  is  no  simple  relation  between  ‘trade  distortions’  and 
‘producer protection’. 
The rest of this section is organized as follows. We first identify the key factors 
which characterize the relationship between trade and standards and its effects. Then we 
identify  under  which  conditions  standards  reduce  trade,  i.e.  act  as  ‘trade  barriers’  or 
enhance  trade,  i.e.  act  as  ‘trade  catalysts’.  Next  we  identify  when  there  is  ‘over-
standardization’ and ‘under-standardization’ and finally we combine all these insights to 
evaluate the validity of the ‘standards-as-(producer)protection’ argument. 
Comparative advantage and compliance with standards  
Trade and the political optimal standards are interrelated in several ways. First, trade 
affects the net impact of standards on producers and consumers as reflected in expression 
(5) and hence the political contributions and their relative influence. For a given level of 
consumption  ( ) c , with larger imports  ( ) m c q º -  and lower domestic production( ) q , 
the effect of standards on aggregate producer profits will be smaller and hence producer 
contributions  lower  and the  lower  producer  influence  on  policy.  In  the  extreme  case 
when there is no domestic production ( ) 0 q = , only consumer interests affect government 
policy. Formally, in this case the first term in equation (5) drops out, and the political 
equilibrium condition equals the optimality condition for consumers. Vice versa, for a   21
given level of domestic production more imports and higher consumption levels imply 
that  the  effects  on  total  consumer  surplus  will  be  larger  and  therefore  consumer 
contributions and their influence on policy higher.  
Second, standards may affect the comparative advantage in production between 
domestic and foreign producers. There are two potential cost effects. Recall that at the 
optimum 
* s  the marginal effect of a standard on domestic producer profits is 
* * *
f f f
p p g g g k k t t
q q q
s s s s s s s s s
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First, standards may affect the relative production costs of foreign and domestic 







* s . This is the argument used by Anderson et 
al. (2004) to argue why EU producers lobby against GMOs: they argue producers in 
countries such as the US and Brazil have a comparative production cost advantage in the 
use of GM technology and therefore it would be rational for EU producers to support 
(rather  than  oppose)  cost  increasing  standards  to  ban  GMOs.  This  argument  makes 
assumptions on the nature of the supply functions and the technology, which may not 
hold in general. Standards will increase production cost advantages when they reinforce 
scale economies (reflected in a downward pivot of the supply function) but not when 
they  have  a  scale  neutral  impact  or  when  they  have  scale  diseconomies  (causing  an 
upward pivot of the supply function). Differences in these effects will induce differences 
in reactions to standards by domestic producers. However the effects are conditional. 
Producers will oppose standards more (or support them less) if they have a comparative 
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. The opposite holds when standards reduce the comparative 
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19 
Second, standards may also affect the comparative advantage through differences 
in transaction costs




  ¶ ¶
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. The relative (domestic versus foreign) impact 
of standards on production costs and transaction costs may be quite different. Countries 
with  high  production  costs  (importers)  may  be  more  efficient  at  implementing  or 
complying with standards. In such cases, standards will shift the cost difference between 
domestic producers and foreign producers in terms of the final cost of the product. As a 
consequence, such comparative cost advantage in transaction costs of complying with a 
standard (see e.g. Salop and Scheffman 1983, and Baldwin 2001 for examples) will lead 
to  higher  producer  contributions  which  favor  the  standard,  rather  than  against  it 
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.
20 Vice versa, when 







 domestic producers will contribute 
less in favor of the standard. 
In Figure 2 we illustrate the case of different transaction costs. We use a simple 
graph with parallel shifts of supply curves to simplify the comparison of producer profits 
before and after the introduction of the standard (our theoretical model is more general). 
                                                 
19 Similarly, producers would support more (or oppose less) if they have a comparative advantage and 
standards reinforce this – and vice versa. However, our model focuses on the import case. 
20 While we do not formally model instrument choice here, if the government has the choice between 
different standards that induce the same effect on consumption, a government will be inclined to enforce a 
standard that is less costly for the domestic sector, or to forbid the use of a technology in which the 
domestic sector has a comparative disadvantage. Fischer and Serra (2000) argue therefore that governments 
tend to use minimum standards that are biased against imports.   23
The increase in transaction costs is depicted by an upward shift in the supply curve (S) 
and the price effect by an upward shift in the horizontal supply function of the outside 
world that determines the price (P). It is clear that when the shift in domestic supply (to 
S
1) is equal to the shift in the foreign supply (to P
s), producers’ profits do not change; 
hence they are indifferent. When the domestic transaction cost increase is smaller than 
the foreign one (represented by the shift to S
2), producers’ profits increase because the 
price effect is larger than the transaction cost effect. The gain in profits is the light grey 
area  and  the  politically  optimal  standard  will  be  higher  than  what  is  optimal  for 
consumers. In contrast, a large upward shift in supply (S
3) – implying higher transaction 
costs  of  implementing  the  standard  –  results  in  a  decrease  in  producer  profits.  The 
resulting loss is the dark grey area and the politically optimal standard will be lower than 
what is optimal for consumers. 
 Notice that, although these factors do relate standards and trade, they do not say 
anything about standards being trade distorting or protectionist measures. 
Standards as Catalysts or Barriers to Trade? 
In our model, standards are (almost) always affecting trade. Only in very special 
circumstances  do  standards  not  affect  trade.  This  is  when  the  effect  on  domestic 
production  exactly  offsets  the  effect  on  consumption.  Define  ( ) , D c s   as  the  inverse 














. Similarly, define  ( ) , A q s  as the 














. The effect of standards on 
trade (imports) is:   24
q c s s
c q q c
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.               (7) 
Notice that the sign of expression (7) may be positive or negative. If the sign of (7) is 
negative standards are ‘trade barriers’, i.e. they reduce trade. However, the sign of (7) can 
also be positive, and then imports increase and standards work as ‘catalysts to trade’. This 
will be the case when the marginal consumption gain (loss) from the standard is larger 
(smaller)  than  the  marginal  gain  (loss)  from  the  standard  in  domestic  production. 
Moreover,  as  we  will  discuss  next,  whether  trade  flows  increase  or  decrease  upon 
introduction of a standard in itself does not automatically relate to (or is not necessarily 
equivalent to) producer protectionism.  
Over- and Under-standardization 
To assess whether public standards reduce welfare (i.e. are set at sub-optimal levels) we 
use the same framework to identify optimal policy as is used in evaluating tariffs in 
traditional trade theory, that is by comparing to the socially optimal trade policy. The 
political  equilibrium  is  said  to  be  welfare  reducing  (suboptimal)  when  the  politically 
optimal tariff 
* t differs from the social optimum tariff 
# t . In a small open economy, this 
analysis leads to the well-known result that the socially optimal tariff level is zero and 
free trade is optimal, i.e. a positive tariff that constrains trade is harmful to social welfare.  
Similarly,  we  compare  the  politically  optimal  standards 
* s   with  the  socially 
optimal standard 
# s  in a small open economy. To determine 
# s  we maximize the welfare 
function as defined in equation (3). The social optimum standard 
# s  is determined by
21:  
                                                 
21 This first order condition is subject to 
# 0 s ³ ; otherwise 
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.          (8) 
# c  and 
# q  denote respectively aggregate consumption and domestic production in the 
social optimum and 
# p  the equilibrium world price. Analogous to condition (5), the first 
term in condition (8) captures the impact on producers and the last term shows the effect 
of a standard on total consumer surplus. The interpretation of the different effects is 
analogous to the discussion following condition (5).  
It is clear from comparing respectively conditions (5) and (8) that the politically 
optimal standard 
* s  will only equal the social optimum standard 
# s  when  p c a a =  in the 










 equal zero at 
# s . Notice that 
# 0 s >  is possible
22. In this case trade flows  may change from the imposition of the 
standard, but this change is socially optimal, i.e. it increases domestic welfare. 
If  the  above  condition  is  not  fulfilled  i.e.  if  p a   and  c a   are  different  in  the 
government’s objective function, the political and social outcomes will be different.
23 
Again, however, the diversion between both optima may be in either direction. Hence 
‘over-standardization’  ( )
* # s s >   or  ‘under-standardization’  ( )
* # s s <   may  result  (see 
Table 1 for an overview). 
                                                 
22 This is for example consistent with the theoretical analysis of Lapan and Moschini (2004) who find that a 
standard prohibiting the sale of GM products in Europe may enhance European welfare. 







# s , implying that 
# s  
is optimal for both lobby groups. In that case neither consumers nor producers have incentives to lobby for 
a different standard, and  * # s s = .   26
If  p c a a > ,  this  will  result  in  over-standardization  ( )
* # s s >   when  producers’ 
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 at 
# s  and in under-standardization 
otherwise. The resulting over-standardization creates higher profits for producers than in 
the social optimum. Hence this over-standardization distorts trade to the advantage of the 






  at 
# s ,  the  resulting  under-standardization 
(given that 
# 0 s > ) reduces the negative effect of the standard on producers’ profits. 
Hence domestic producers benefit from this under-standardization such that this under-
standardization serves as protection in disguise. Box 1 illustrates the latter case. 














# s . Whether these suboptimal standards are 
‘protectionist’ or not depends on the impact of standards on producers. However, at 










 always have opposite signs (except for the trivial case where both equal 
zero  and 
* # s s = ).  Hence  when  over-standardization  results  0
c
s
¶P   >   ¶  
,  producers 
always loose from this over-standardization with respect to their situation in the social 






  at 
# s .  The  politically  optimal  standard 
* s   is  then,  although 
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# s . Box 2 provides an illustration of the latter   27
case. In both cases the suboptimal standards result in trade distortions that do not protect 
domestic producers. 
Discussion: Rational or biased perceptions 
So  far,  we  have  assumed  that  consumers  have  rational  expectations  and  unbiased 
perceptions  of  standards.  However,  studies  claim  that  perceptions  of  the  public  may 
differ importantly from expert opinions on a diversity of issues (e.g. Flynn et al. 1993; 
Savadori et al. 2004). If so, it is clear that biased perceptions can be an important factor 
in the political economy of public standards.  
Without going into detail into the micro-foundations of perceptions, we just want 
to point out that our model can be easily extended to include biased perceptions. To 
illustrate this formally, define l  as a measure of the bias in perception of consumers: l  
is equal to 1 if consumers’ perceptions of the standard’s effects are unbiased.  s l  is the 
standard  perceived  by  consumers  and  s
l   is  the  politically  optimal  standard  when 
perceptions are possibly biased. It is intuitive that a bias in the perception of consumers 
will affect  s
l  (See Appendix for the formal derivation of this result). A positive bias in 
consumer  perceptions  leads  to  increased  consumer  contributions,  and  hence  higher 
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 given that an increase in the standard increases   28
consumption  at  s
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  and  low  average 
consumer quality preferences.
25 
Several  studies  find  that  consumer  perceptions  are  functions  of  the  level  of 
consumer trust in government regulators, attitudes toward scientific discovery, and media 
coverage (Curtis et al. 2004; Loureiro, 2003, Kalaitzandonakes et al. 2004). For example, 
a  reason  for  the  differences  in perceptions  across  countries  explored  by  Curtis  et  al. 
(2008) is the different organization and structure of the media in rich and poor countries. 
Mass media is the main source of information for consumers to form attitudes regarding 
many  issues,  including  GMFs  (Hoban  and  Kendall  1993;  Shepherd  et  al.  1998). 
Commercial  media  is  more  likely  to  highlight  potential  risks  associated  with 
biotechnology in its reporting (McCluskey and Swinnen 2004). The increased cost of 
media information in developing countries leads to lower media consumption and to a 
proportionately stronger reduction in risk reporting. In addition, government control of 
the media is stronger in poor countries. This may lead to a more positive coverage of new 
technologies  such  as  biotechnology,  which  in  turn  may  contribute  to  more  favorable 
perceptions  of  GMFs  and  biotechnology  among  consumers  in  these  less  developed 
countries. The public is most negative towards GMFs in most of the developed countries, 
especially in the European Union (EU) and Japan. The United States is an exception as 
consumers are largely ambivalent about GMFs. In lesser developed countries (LDCs) 
                                                 







, see Appendix. 
25  ( ) ( ) c N p s
l l f e l = - +  denotes the aggregate consumption in the political optimum when consumer 
perceptions are possibly biased.   29
consumer attitudes toward GMFs are less negative and in many cases positive (see Curtis 
et al. 2008 for a review of the evidence). Therefore, the media structure and information 
provision is likely to induce a more pro-standard attitude  0
I
l ¶   >   ¶  
 in rich countries than 
in  poor,  as  increased  access  to  media  will  increase  attention  to  risks  and  negative 
implications of low standards.  
An additional related element is how the rural/urban population structure affects 
perceptions.  McCluskey et al. (2003) find that people associated with  agriculture are 
much more in favor of GM crops than urban consumers
26. It is likely that consumers who 
are associated with agriculture have a better idea of the amount of pesticides used on 
non-GM  crops than urban consumers, and hence of the benefits from GMF (such as 
pesticide  resistant  crops).  As  developing  countries  have  a  higher  proportion  of  rural 
residents, this may contribute to explain the differences in preferences.  
Hence, both perception factors may reinforce the effects of consumer preferences 
and  quality  of  institutions  in  inducing  a  positive  relationship  between  standards  and 
development. 
Conclusions 
In  this  paper we  have  developed  a formal  model  of  the political economy of 
public standards. We use our theoretical model to derive the political optimum and to 
analyze the different factors that have an influence on this political equilibrium. Under 
the  assumption  of  a  small  open  economy  and  simultaneous  consumer  and  producer 
lobbying,  the  political  weights  of  the  respective  groups  influence  the  optimal  public 
                                                 
26 Unpublished research of Scott Rozelle and Jikun Huang confirms this result for China.   30
standard  and  the  direction  and  magnitude  of  these  effects  depend  on  the  standards’ 
relative benefits for the different interest groups. Domestic costs related to the standard 
affect the level of the public standard while an increase in the costs of foreign producers 
related to the standard may increase or decrease the politically optimal standard. 
We  also  examine  the  positive  relationship  between  standards  and  economic 
development. Higher income levels lead to more stringent standards because of higher 
consumer  preferences  for  quality,  less  costly  enforcement  of  standards  and  lower 
production  costs  related  to  standards  for  domestic  producers.  In  combination  these 
factors  may  result  in  a  pro-standard  coalition  of  consumers  and  producers  in  rich 
countries and an anti-standard coalition in poor countries.  
We also identify the key factors which characterize the relationship between trade 
and  standards  and  its  effects.  Trade  affects  the  net  impact  of  standards  on  domestic 
producers  and  consumers  and  hence  their  political  contributions.  Standards  may  also 
affect the comparative production cost advantage between countries, which may lead to 
either  higher  or  lower  standards.  Similarly,  the  relative  (domestic  versus  foreign) 
transaction (enforcement and control) costs of standards affect the politically optimal 
standard. 
Finally,  our  model  provides  an  analytical  framework  to  determine  whether 
standards  serve  as  protection  in  disguise,  or  not.  We  show  that  standards  may  be 
‘barriers’  to  trade  but  also  ‘catalysts’  to  trade,  and  that  both  ‘under-’  or  ‘over-
standardization’ may occur, depending on a variety of factors. Our findings imply that 
the effects of specific standards should be analyzed carefully before categorizing them as 
protectionist instruments.   31
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Tables 
Table 1: Protectionist characteristics of standards with different political weights 
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Figure 1: Notification of new SPS measures to the WTO (Source: Henson 2006) 
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The  changes  in  supply  S  and  demand  D  are  represented  by  upward  pivots  for  higher 













  at 
# s   and  under-standardization  ( )
* # s s <   occurs  given  that 
p c a a > . Under-standardization  is benefiting the  domestic  producers  as  their  profits  are 
higher compared to the social optimum (abd > abc). Notice also that 
* # o m m m < < .  
a 
b  c  d  e 
Box 1: Under-standardization benefiting domestic producers 





















The changes in demand D and prices P are represented by respectively upward pivots and 














# s  and under-standardization  ( )
* # s s <  occurs when  p c a a < . 
Under-standardization hurts domestic producers as their profits are lower compared to the 
social optimum (ade < afg). Notice also that 
* # o m m m > > .  
a 
b  c 
d  e 
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Appendix 
A1.  Proof of the truthfulness of the contribution schemes 
Define  J  as the set of active lobby groups i.e.  { } , J p c = , 
* s  as the politically optimal 
standard, and 
*
j C  as the optimal contribution scheme for lobby group  j . Following 
Lemma 2 of Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Proposition 1 of Grossman and 
Helpman (1994), the equilibrium  { } ( )
* * , j j J C s
Î  is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of 
the standard-setting game if and only if: 
(a) 
*
j C  is feasible for all  j J Î ; 
(b) 
* s  maximizes  ( ) ( )
*
j j j J C s W s a
Î + ∑ ; 
(c) 
* s  maximizes  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* *
k k j j j J s C s C s W s a
Î P - + + ∑  for every k J Î ; 
(d) for every k J Î there exists a 
k s  that maximizes  ( ) ( )
*
j j j J C s W s a




k C s = . 
From condition (c) we derive the first order condition 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )





s C s C s W s
s s s s
a
Î
¶P ¶ ¶ ¶
- + + =
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ∑  for all k J Î .      (A1) 
Maximization of the government’s objective function (condition (b)) requires the first 
order condition 












¶ ¶ ∑ .              (A2) 
Taken together, conditions (A1) and (A2) imply   43
( ) ( )
* * * *





 for all  j J Î .              (A3) 
Condition (A3) proves that all contribution schemes are locally truthful around 
* s . This 
implies in our political economy model that lobby groups will set their contributions in 
accordance with their expected profits and how these are marginally affected by the 
standard. 
A2.  Proof of Condition (5) 
Production: Domestic producers maximize profits by choosing the optimal quantity q. 
With  ( ) , p q p g q s   P = × -    this result in the first order condition 
( ) g , 0
p g
p q s q
q q
¶P ¶
= - - =
¶ ¶
;  
hence  ( ) g ,
g





.                 (A.4) 
Expression (A.4) defines the optimal behavior of domestic producers in the equilibrium 
and implicitly defines q as a function  ( ) q , p s . Deriving  ( ) p s P  with respect to s, and 
making use of the envelope theorem and equilibrium condition (A.4) results in 
( ) ( ) g ,
p q p g g q p g
p q s q q
s s s s q s s s
¶P   ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶   = - + - - = -     ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶    
      (A.5) 
Consumption: Only consumers with  ( ) i p s f e > +  will consume the product. Hence total 


















P = = -     +   ∫ . Deriving   44









  ¶P ¶   = - -       ¶ + ¶    
              (A.6) 
with  ( ) ( ) ( ) c , p s N p s f e = - + . 
Government: The government’s objective function is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) p c V C C W p c s = s s s a a + +  in which the political weights  j a  are exogenously 
given. We have that 
p c
p c
C C V W
s s s s
a a
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
= + +
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
. From the functional form and the 













around the politically optimal 














= + + +
¶ ¶ ¶
 around the optimum. The 
government maximizes its objective function with respect to s  0
V
s
¶   =   ¶  
 subject to 
0 s ³ . Using the expressions (A.5) and (A.6) we obtain the result that: 
( ) ( )
2 *
* 2 *
* 1 1 0
2
p c
V p g N p p
q c
s s s s s
a a f
e
      ¶  ¶ ¶  ¶       = + - + + - - =         ¶ ¶ ¶ + ¶            
    (A.7) 
This first order condition determines the resulting standard under the condition that 
* 0 s ³ ; in any other case 
* 0 s = . 
* c  and 
* q  denote respectively the consumption and 
domestic production in the optimum, with  ( ) ( )
* * * c N p s f e = - + . 
A3.  Comparative Statics   45
Comparative statics analyses on 
* s  only applies to when 
* 0 s >  in condition (A.7). For 
cases in which condition (A.7) results in 
* 0 s = , comparative statics results are trivial and 
equal to zero.  
Condition (A.7) implicitly defines 
* s  as a function of several variables. Hence:  
* 2
2 2
s V s x
x V s
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
= -
¶ ¶ ¶
                  (A.8) 
From our assumptions on the convexity of  ( ) , g q s  and  ( ) p s  in s, it follows that 
2 2 0 V s ¶ ¶ <





 is determined by (is the same as) the sign of 
2V s x ¶ ¶ ¶ . 






s s s a
¶ ¶ ¶   = -   ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶  
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    ¶ ¶   = - -     ¶ ¶ + ¶    




















* s . 
Consumer preferences f : 
                                                 









¶ ¶   = + -   ¶ ¶ ¶  
















* s . Violation of this condition would imply that the individual willingness to pay for a 
marginal increase of the standard is negative at 
* s , even for the individual with the 
highest preference for quality ( ) i f f = . We abstract from this case where consumption 
falls to zero by assuming that this condition holds. 
A4.  Effect of a standard on imports m 
Deriving consumption  ( ) ( ) ( ) c , p s N p s f e = - +  with respect to s is equal to 
 
c N p p
s s s s e e
¶ ¶   = -   ¶ + + ¶  
.                (A.9) 
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Similarly, deriving the equilibrium condition for producers (condition (A.4)) with respect 
to s gives 
2
2 2 2
q p s g s q g q s
s g q q g q
¶ ¶ ¶ -¶ ¶ - ×¶ ¶ ¶
=
¶ ×¶ ¶ + ×¶ ¶
.              (A.11) 
Making use of the inverse supply function  ( ) ( ) , g ,
g





 (see expression (A.4)) 
we can rewrite (A.11)as:   47
s
q
p s A q
s A
¶ ¶ - ¶
=
¶
                  (A12) 















Imports m are defined as m c q º - , hence using expressions (A10) and (A12): 
( ) q c s s
c q q c
A D c q D A m p
s s D A A D s
  + ¶ - ¶ ¶
= = + -    ¶ ¶ ¶  
,           (A.13) 
which cannot be signed unambiguously. 
A5.  Consumer perceptions 
We define l  as a measure of the bias in perception of consumers: l  is equal to 1 if 
consumers’ perceptions of the standard’s effects are unbiased.  s l  is the standard 
perceived by consumers and we redefine utility as 
( )    if he buys the good with standard   at price 
=
0                       if he does not buy 
i
i
s p s p
u
f e l  + - 

 
     (A.14) 
The politically optimal standard, s
l , is then determined by the following first order 
condition, subject to  0 s
l ³ : 
( ) ( )
2
2 1 1 0
2
p c
V p g N p p
q c







      ¶  ¶ ¶  ¶       = + - + + - - =         ¶ ¶ ¶ + ¶            
.  (A.15) 
( ) ( ) ( ) c , p s N p s
l l f e l = - +  and q
l  denote respectively the aggregate consumption 
and domestic production in the political optimum and  p
l is the equilibrium world price. 






V N p s p c
s s s s
l l l l
l l a f
l e l e l
      ¶ ¶     = + - +     ¶ ¶ + + ¶        
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l . Hence, when consumption is increasing in the standard at s








. However, when average consumer preferences f  are low such that 
2 2 p s c p
s N s s
l l l
f
e l e l
  ¶
< -   + ¶ +  







l , we find that  0
s
l
l
¶
<
¶
. 
 